Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Stephen Blank, James George Jatras, Darren Spink, Ira Straus
Last week, after four months of talks, the mediating effort by the UN Security Council “troika” - the United States, Russia and the European Union - to obtain a settlement agreement on the final status for Kosovo failed to bridge the gap between the Kosovo Albanians and the Government of Serbia.
“Neither party was able to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. We turned over every stone, we explored every possible reasonable outcome, and the parties were unable to modify their position or to accommodate the views of the other parties. We regrettably concluded, as the troika, that the ideas were fully explored but no common ground could be found,” says the report the troika sent to the UN secretary general last Friday. The UN Security Council set Dec. 10, 2007 as the day for discussion on Kosovo’s final status. Since the troika report arrived only on Dec. 7, the UN Security Council has postponed the discussion until Dec. 17.
Before the troika’s effort, Martti Ahtissaari, the former Finnish president and chief U.N. negotiator on Kosovo, concluded in March that a political settlement was impossible. In what became known as the Ahtissaari Plan, he called for a phased transition to independence for Kosovo, supervised at first by European Union administrators and protected by NATO troops.
The failure of the latest mediating effort sets the stage for Kosovo to declare independence unilaterally before the New Year. The new Kosovo Albanian government has already said that it would move to an independence declaration.
The United States and the EU appear to support this drive by the Kosovo Albanians for a unilateral declaration of independence, while Russia is strongly opposed to it and advocates more talks between the two sides.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that talks had been exhausted and suggested that the international community would have to accept Kosovo’s drive for independence.
Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov clashed over Kosovo during the latest Russia - NATO Council meeting. “Washington’s position that Kosovo’s independence is inevitable is the main obstacle towards finding a negotiated solution,” argued Lavrov.
Although the parties pledged to avoid the use of force, it is clear that a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians would be highly destabilizing for the region and for European security as a whole. Despite Washington’s arguments that Kosovo is not a precedent, this move would clearly have repercussions for other separatist movements in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe. As a minimum, it would have a direct bearing on the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union, particularly Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Nagorno-Karabakh appears to be on a path toward a negotiated settlement).
David Cameron, the leader of the British Conservative Party, recently warned that a new war in Kosovo is likely to break out after the unilateral declaration of independence, while NATO had significantly drawn down its troop presence in Kosovo and has been preoccupied with the operation in Afghanistan. Last Friday, NATO vowed to maintain a military presence in Kosovo even if it declares independence.
Is a new armed conflict in Kosovo likely? Will it be initiated by Serbia or by the Kosovo Albanians? How will Russia react to Kosovo’s declaration of independence? How will NATO react if hostilities break out? What will be the long term international consequences of Kosovo’s unilateral independence? Is the West right or wrong in backing this drive for independence while denying the same rights to other ethnic groups that have already secured de facto independence? Was President Vladimir Putin right in publicly warning the West last month against such a move? How will Russia and the US and the EU sort out their differences over Kosovo? How will this issue impact Russia’s presidential campaign and the power transition in Moscow?
James George Jatras, Director, American Council for Kosovo (www.savekosovo.org) Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC; Washington, D.C.
You would think that rational minds in Washington would not lightly provoke a new confrontation with Moscow right now, when Russian cooperation is needed on serious items, not just Iraq and Afghanistan, but also North Korea and Iran. But it appears that is just what is planned with respect to what euphemistically is called the “final status” of Kosovo. Indeed, to the extent that American policy takes Russia into account, forcing a result on Serbia over Russia’s objections seems to be less a deterrent than an incitement.
Washington policymakers display a distinct eagerness in their plunge toward a “diplomatic train wreck,” as the situation was labeled by the chief architect of the U.S. policy himself, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke. Calling the shots both inside the Bush Administration (through his former colleagues at the State Department) and as shadow Secretary of State in a potential Hillary Clinton Administration (and the almost certain author of her recent statement on Kosovo), the ham-fisted Holbrooke has suggested the need to humiliate Russia as well as Serbia. The unpredictable chain reaction that would ensue, as Foreign Minister Lavrov has termed it, seemingly matters not at all.
The Holbrooke-driven program is accompanied by the usual deceitful assurances of protection of Kosovo’s Serbs. NATO’s forces in Kosovo reportedly are beefing up their presence in Serbian enclaves - not in the Albanian areas, from which attacks would be launched - to deal with any “troublemakers” following a unilateral declaration of independence by the gaggle of war criminals, jihad terrorists, and mafia kingpins who dominate the Muslim Albanian community. It’s not hard to see how this scenario would play out. By day, NATO would try to seal off support from Serbia and seize Kosovo Serbs’ weapons to ensure their helplessness before the “authority” of the new “legitimate government” in Pristina. By night, Albanian thugs would torch Serbian houses and shoot at their inhabitants, who had been rendered unable to defend themselves. NATO would shrug its collective shoulders: “Well, you know, we can’t be everywhere at once.” And after all, they’re only Serbs and deserve what they get - they can clear out or die.
Despite the stated position of the Democratic Party (DS) of President Boris Tadic and Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic that Serbia would not respond to such outrages with military force, it is hard to see how official Belgrade would be able to sit passively by and watch intensified Albanian Muslim terrorism against Serbian citizens. The DS’s coalition partner, the Democratic Party of Serbia of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, has made no such pledge and would be backed up by the opposition Radicals and Socialists. Once the western policy had triggered violence, as it undoubtedly would, it would be hard for anyone to stop it. This doesn’t even take into account consequent regional destabilization from restive Albanians in nearby areas, starting with those in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Can anything derail Washington’s reckless determination to set off this meltdown? Two possibilities exist. First, there remains the hope, if only a slim one, that at long last someone in the Bush Administration, presumably at the White House or the Pentagon, will apply the brakes to the State Department’s out-of-control rush to disaster. Second, that as the magnitude of what may occur becomes more evident, some key European countries - notably Germany, which has the most to lose from the collapse of any mission in Kosovo with vulnerable EU personnel on the ground - may push for further delay. Both Washington and the European capitals need to wake up to the extent that countermeasures from Serbia, military or otherwise, would likely be more effective than expected, bolstered by an unspecified degree of support from Russia against overt foreign aggression and illegal occupation of Serbian territory.
Also, the possibility of a creative initiative from Moscow should not be overlooked. President Putin’s June proposal to President George W. Bush to share a radar station in Azerbaijan for missile defense purposes threw an unexpected monkey wrench into the U.S. plan to base missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. A number of preemptive options exist for Moscow similarly to shift the ground under Washington’s program for Kosovo: visible aid to Serbia, including military support, and a Russian presence at exercises in southern Serbia near the Kosovo line of control; extending to Serbia observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Russian movement on the “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union prior to any declaration of independence from Pristina; and movement toward a Russia-Belarus union.
Finally, it should also be noted that the Russian Navy will soon conduct exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, for 15 years a NATO lake. While a U.S.-Russia military confrontation over Kosovo is extremely unlikely, even the most remote risk is unacceptable in light of the worthless “prize” Washington seeks to win: the creation of a failed, rogue state. The fact that some in Washington are eager to provoke this looming “stealth crisis” is a testament to the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of those in charge of America’s Balkan policies.
Darren Spinck, Global Strategic Communications Group, Washington, DC
It is far too early to accurately predict whether or not widespread violence will again break out in Kosovo following the end of failed negotiations to determine Kosovo’s future status. However, the complete and final ethnic cleansing of Kosovo’s remaining Serbs is sadly assured should the international community allow Kosovo Albanians to use terror and intimidation to gain its independence from the Republic of Serbia.
While Hashim Thaci, Kosovo’s newly “elected” prime minister, has stated that he will not rush a unilateral declaration of independence until March 2008 at the earliest and has urged restraint among Kosovo Albanians, a return to violence is quite possible, and this outbreak of violence could rival the Muslim Albanians’ three-day reign of terror in 2004 that resulted in 18 deaths, 600 injuries and the destruction of 30 Orthodox Christian churches and 110 Christian Serb houses. Thaci is unlikely to stop such future violence against Serbs should the international community either recognize or choose not to recognize Kosovo’s independence, since he bears command responsibility as a KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) leader for the deaths of 661 Christian Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo, serious physical injury to 518 Serbs and the abduction of 584 people. Thaci’s reputation as a criminal is well documented, with Germany’s federal intelligence service reporting that he heads an Albanian mafia operation out of the Grand Hotel in Pristina.
Prior to the Dec. 10 UN Security Council deadline for negotiations on Kosovo’s future status, sporadic Kosovo Albanian violence against Kosovo’s remaining Serbs has already occurred, including a Dec. 8 arson attack on a Kosovo Serb home and the destruction of Serb gravestones in an Orthodox cemetery. In addition, weapons caches have been found throughout Kosovo, particularly close to the Macedonian border, and reports continue to circulate that masked, former KLA thugs have restarted patrolling highways and stopping cars, searching for Serbs.
Should Thaci follow through with his threat and declare unilateral independence for the Serbian province, the forcible and illegal detachment of Kosovo and Metohija from the Republic of Serbia would unquestionably destabilize the Balkans and create a precedent for other separatist movements. The question is whether or not the United States and the European Union would recklessly recognize such a dangerous move.
Russia would likely urge the UN Security Council to not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence and would almost certainly use its veto power as a permanent Security Council member to block UN membership for a forcibly detached Kosovo. With Russia’s position on Kosovo independence clear, the question remains whether or not the European Union is prepared to create a schism within Europe. Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Romania have already voiced strong opposition against Kosovo independence, fearing similar secessionist movements in their respective countries.
Although it is widely assumed that the United States will whole-heartedly support a unilateral declaration of independence since President Bush and Secretary of State Rice have already made public declarations supporting Kosovo’s illegal detachment from Serbia, the Administration’s increasingly lame-duck status may ultimately result in a reversal of course. Whether or not one agrees with the Bush Administration’s justification for the war in Iraq, there are few who would disagree that the less-than-desirable post-invasion aftermath could have been prevented had the United States not acted unilaterally. This, in conjunction with a slew of other foreign policy and domestic disasters, most notably the White House’s support for an illegal immigrant amnesty and the apparent misreading of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, according to the latest National Intelligence Estimate, could cause U.S. citizens to voice their disdain for yet another unilateral Bush Administration move regarding Kosovo independence.
While a unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo’s Albanian “leadership” will not likely result in a change in policy in Russia during the run-up to the March 2008 Russian presidential elections, a policy change is quite possible in the United States during President Bush’s last year in office. Now that likely Democratic presidential nominee Senator Hillary Clinton has publicly supported Kosovo independence, it is hard to imagine that the Republican frontrunner candidates would not take an opportunity to challenge her position. Should the American public grasp the likely dangers posed by a unilateral recognition of Kosovo independence, a groundswell of outrage directed at Congress could also occur, similar to the grassroots movement that destroyed the illegal immigrant amnesty bill earlier this year. If Members of Congress receive enough complaints prior to the 2008 U.S. House and Senate elections, President Bush or the next U.S. president may have no choice but to change this current dangerous policy in support of Kosovo independence…
Stephen Blank, professor, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
(Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)
These are important questions and nobody can have definitive answers to all of them. Certainly we cannot predict what NATO or Moscow will do if fighting breaks out, because much depends on the way in which fighting does break out, if it happens. Certain things, however, can already be said with reasonable assurance. NATO, for example, appears to be ready to take a tough line against any side that begins hostilities, unlike the case in 2004. Second, and Moscow and Belgrade will have to learn to accept this bitter but nevertheless inescapable conclusion - namely, that there is no way that Serbia can achieve sovereignty over Kosovo at any time in the near future. Regardless of the merits of the case, and Serb claims hide that Belgrade has much to answer for here, it lost control over Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and will not get it back anytime soon. Whether or not it is justifiable, under the circumstances, the Albanian desire for independence is too strong for Belgrade to stop. If Belgrade would announce a willingness to negotiate the terms of independence, including an assurance of no greater Albania and the safeguarding of its religious shrines, even at the eleventh hour, it could avoid not only the threat of bloodshed but also of further isolation. The Kosovars would then also have no choice but to negotiate.
Beyond that, following General George Marshall’s advice about difficult problems, we need to enlarge its scope. Obviously this problem touches on Balkan security and could have repercussions in Moldova and Georgia, not to mention Russia itself. But I do not buy Moscow’s strong hints that this precedent applies to Georgia or Moldova for many reasons that transcend the limitations of this space. But one solution is a package deal in which both Kosovo and Serbia, as independent states would automatically be taken into the EU as prospective members provided they fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and acquis communautaire. Membership in NATO, according to its criteria could then follow as well. Contingent upon this is Brussels willingness to subsidize the process. As an exercise in preventive diplomacy that provides both sides with what seems to be an irresistible prize, but ensures international supervision of their development, that idea certainly seems a better and more far-sighted one than any produced by the current fruitless negotiations.
Ira Straus, U.S. Coordinator, Committee on Russia in NATO
The solution to the Kosovo problem is well enough known - in 19th Century practice, at least. It is for Russia and the West to impose a division of Kosovo.
Back in the 1800s, the Concert of Europe learned to function by cooperation among the Great Powers. They would decide on, and if necessary impose, a solution, aiming at a balanced respect for interests at stake, corresponding roughly to the balance or distribution of power among the Great Powers, and a minimization of disruption on the ground. In Kosovo, that means the province would be divided between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs. Serb-majority northern Kosovo could remain united with Serbia if it wished, as it would; Albanian-majority southern Kosovo would become independent. Kosovar Albanians would be told to relinquish claims to independence for other Albanian-majority regions within Serbia proper; Serbs, to renounce sovereignty over the Albanian-majority part of Kosovo and stop talking about annexing the Serb part of Bosnia. Serb and Albanian interests would both be taken into consideration; neither would get everything it wants, both would get what is most important. Russia and the Western powers would also divide their interests, each realizing the main part of its interest; and each would impose the terms on “its” side, NATO forces being present to impose on the Kosovar government. Borders would be changed, but with formal consent by the parties themselves even if coerced, and with the consent of the Great Powers as ratified by the Security Council. This would overcome the objection to changing borders. No precedent would be set, except the precedent that, if the parties on the ground are too obstinate, they may find the powers imposing a solution on them, and the more obstinate party may be penalized. It would be a salutary lesson.
Serbs and Kosovar Albanians seem broadly to believe that a de facto partition is inevitable, but expect it to come from a unilateral Kosovar declaration of independence, a unilateral Serb secession from Kosovo, and bloodshed. This would have all the disadvantages imaginable: bloodshed, exacerbation of mutual hatreds and ethnic cleansings, an unresolved conflict and countries with unrecognized borders, sharp temporary exacerbation of Russia-West tensions (with renewal of the risk, probably slight this time, of coming to outright war), and a running sore between Russia and the West thereafter.
The EU has agreed that a partition is acceptable, if agreed to by both parties. The whole problem is that neither party is capable of proposing or negotiating it. That is why a partition has to be imposed, not just passively allowed for.
Both parties on the ground make it a point of honor that they want Kosovo whole and complete. If that were not enough, the Serb constitution forbids cession of any territory - which, for practical purposes, means that Serbia has ceded to the international community the obligation to impose a solution, and should be glad if the solution respects Serb interests at all.
The interesting question is why the international community is not doing it.
Russia and the West have both worked themselves into a corner on Kosovo, and have been almost as incapable of proposing and negotiating a partition as the parties on the ground. Instead, they have talked themselves to a dead-end, debating over who should have the sovereignty over the whole of Kosovo and with what supervisory qualifications, and abandoned negotiations when they were predictably unable to reach agreement on that. Once an American paleoconservative, William Lind, proposed partition at a conference on Russia-West cooperation; the Russian participants responded with horror: it would contravene principles they were holding dear, for evident debating and bargaining purposes of their own in international discussions. NATO made the mistake when the 1999 Kosovo war was ended of refusing the Russian peacekeepers a zone of their own, for fear that it would lead to a Serb concentration there and a partition of Kosovo. In retrospect, a Russian zone would have been far wiser, preparing the ground for a relatively painless partition. Instead, in the blindness of triumph, a commitment was made to deliver Kosovo whole for its supposed multi-ethnic future, throwing to the wind NATO’s earlier caution about the KLA.
Russian politics, in turn, became once again beholden to Serbian nationalism, a sort of emotional slavery that began in the early 1990s and kept growing with every face off between Serbia and the West. It went over the edge in 1999, when Yevgeny Primakov encouraged Milosevic to trust in Russia’s support no matter what he did in Kosovo - something just as responsible for the problem as NATO’s subsequent mistakes, and even more reprehensible morally. Mass demonstrations in Moscow were proclaiming, with more than a touch of hysteria, that “NATO is bombing Belgrade today, Moscow tomorrow.” Russia seemed to be recovering from this hysteria in the days after Yeltsin dumped Primakov and worked with the West, Concert of Europe style, to restore peace; but the West’s one-sided implementation of the peace sent Russia reeling straight back into the arms of the Serb nationalists.
That is how the Great Powers became as unwise as their clients on the ground.
If they want to save themselves more trouble, they will think again and start talking partition. And call off the dogs on both sides until they have it worked out.
|
Entries and
Why cant Serbia use opperation storm ? Where Croatia
with the help of Nato expelled about 20 percent of their population mostly all of the remaining Serbs, non Roman catholics . The nazis hadnt killed from the second WWar . Croatia hasnt suffered at all for this ,inspite of the fact they are unrepentive nazis , with the nazi flag singing nazi songs . This hasnt bothered England and France one bit . Serbia only wants to expell the terrorists . This is something evrey goverment has to do . Serbia would be in good shape if ony 5 Percent of it population was forced out . But this 5 percent is who NATO and UNITED STATES favors
Comment by eric — December 14, 2007 #